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Manuscript ID IJOPM-12-2016-0708.R1 entitled "Governing Embedded Partner Networks: 
Certification and Partner Communities in the IT Sector" 
 
Response to Reviewer: 1  
(original comment in italics) 
 
The authors have conducted an extensive revision and in the revised version they have 
approached and solved several of my previous concerns. I am happy with how they have 
responded to many of my issues and find the paper much improved. It is now clearer and 
more focused (especially in the introduction and conclusions) and I am happy with the 
method responses. Still, I believe the IT context elaboration needs further work and the 
writing of the frame of references can be compressed. Here is a summary of issues: 
 
We thank you for taking the time to review our paper and for the positive words regarding 
our revision. We have taken on board your constructive feedback which has helped us to 
improve the paper still further. Below we outline how we have addressed each of your 
remaining concerns. Hopefully you will find them satisfactory. 
 
1. Introduction 
a. Scope/focus: The inclusion of products and services as well as software and hardware 
should be mentioned early in the manuscript – and its relevance/implication for the study 
shortly reflected on. 
 
We have taken on board your point regarding the context of our study and its implications. 
The context of our study is large Information Technology (IT) suppliers, such as Microsoft, 
Cisco, IBM and Oracle. These organizations supplier organization and numerous smaller 
partner organizations through which it sells and delivers hardware (e.g. computers, servers 
and network equipment) and/or software products. For consistency we use the generic term 
product (which encompasses both manufactured goods and intangible services) whilst 
recognising that in today’s IT marketplace the boundaries are blurring. In the study we 
controlled for the type of product (hardware versus software). We found that including the 
type of product as a control has no impact on the results. However we do suggest as the 
sector encompasses both hardware and software suppliers, further research could explore the 
relative importance of certification and partner communities based on the type of IT supplier. 
 
We hope that this addresses your concerns in this area.  
 
 
b. The phrase ‘serial of three-way interactions’ in the end of the introduction is not that 
obvious to me. I understand it after reading the method but not in the introduction. 
 
As you correctly point out the sentence was unclear. It was also unnecessary to include this in 
the introduction. Therefore we have removed the offending sentence.  
 
 
2. Frame of references:  
a. The entire frame of reference section is still very long and I believe all parts should be 
possible to compress, by focusing on your constructs and context. Please, go over the entire 
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section and shorten. The section is still more focused than before, but there are still 
examples, terms and references in the section which I don't really believe are important and 
necessary. Especially, sections on certification and communities are still quite long and I am 
sure they can be compressed without losing content.  
 
As suggested we have substantially rewritten the section on the Frame of Reference focusing 
more deeply on certification and partner communities in the IT sector (see pp6-10). We have 
tried to be as succinct as possible, reducing this section by over a page in length, whilst at the 
same time improving the elaboration of the IT context (as suggested in your comments 
below).  
 
Hopefully this has now alleviates your concerns regarding the length of this section. 
 
b. Collective governance modes (p. 7, row 30): What is modes here? I don’t understand. 
 
We realise that use of ‘collective governance modes’ was unclear. We were trying to make 
the point that IT suppliers, suffering from network overload, can manage their partners more 
effectively through specific governance mechanisms that aim to enhance the performance of 
both the individual partners and the network as a whole. Therefore IT suppliers have 
introduced two contrasting mechanisms to manage their networks - the certification of 
partners and the establishment of online partner communities. 
 
We realise that the term collective governance mode was unclear and have removed it.  
 
c. The new para and sentences about the IT context improves this perspective, but you 
can be even more clear and precise regarding the content/design of certifications and 
communities in the IT sector. This is super-important for this paper and the understanding 
and interpretation of the empirical findings. As a consequence I also believe IT context 
elaboration is still missing in the discussion. 
 
As suggested we have improved the discussion around the nature of certification and partner 
communities in the IT context (see pp7-9). We have introduced more concrete examples from 
organizations such as SAS. Microsoft and Cisco to illustrate the two governance mechanisms. 
We hope that this section is a lot clearer and provides sufficient contextual background. 
Furthermore we have addressed the context more clearly in the discussion (see below). 
 
 
3. Methodology: Respondent companies are positioned to deal with the supplier 
organization directly, but how they then be positioned as 3rd tier in relation to the supplier? 
Could you clarify this? 
 
We realize that this was unclear. Certification usually has tier levels representing partners’ 
capabilities. For example, SAS (a provider of analytics software) has silver, gold and platinum 
partners (SAS, 2017). Advancement form one tier to the next is determined by the number of 
employees who have passed SAS’s certification exams and the taking of specific training courses. 
Which have explained this in the manuscript on p7.  To avoid confusion with the common use of tiers 
in the supply chain literature we now refer to the tier levels as: entry/foundation- , mid- and top-tier 
level partners. We thank you for identifying this potential confusion. 
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4. Discussion: 
a. Page 28, row 45: Bureaucratic is introduced but is this term needed? It is not used 
before. Does it mean anything else than formal? 
 
Thank you for pointing out that ‘bureaucratic’ was redundant and we have removed it from 
the sentence. 
 
 
b. It is referred to the IT context but I still believe these references and elaborations are 
too limited. The fact that you study IT companies’ partners is an important focus of your 
study and should affect the findings. Consequently, I find your discussion to be too general. 
You have emphasized the IT context in the beginning of the manuscript (Introduction and 
beginning of the Frame of references) but the discussion is still too general. I find this being 
the major concern remaining in the manuscript. 
 
Thank you for pushing us on the IT context. We agree that the IT context is an important 
element of the study. Suppliers in the IT sector faced with network overload as a result of 
attempting to control a dispersed network of tens of thousands of partners have introduced 
two mechanism to maximise the performance of their partners. Suppliers certify their partners 
and provide communities of practice to support them. These two network governance 
mechanisms synergistically influence the relationship partners have with their supplier. We 
have thoroughly re-written the discussion to bring the context to the fore (see pp 26-30). 
 
 
5. Typos: I haven’t read the manuscript to identify grammar and spelling details, but 
still recognize several typos. A thorough language editing is needed: 
 
We apologise for the typos and other grammatical errors in the paper. The ones you mention 
have been corrected. We have been a lot more conscientious about identifying spelling and 
grammar mistakes. Hopefully we have removed all remaining errors. 
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Manuscript ID IJOPM-12-2016-0708.R1 entitled "Governing Embedded Partner Networks: 
Certification and Partner Communities in the IT Sector" 
 
Response to Reviewer: 2 
(original comment in italics) 
 
I would like to thank the authors for revising their manuscript. They have addressed many of 
my comments clearly and succinctly. However, the links between the theorising and H1 and 
H2 are still not clear (original comment 2) and the results and discussion (original comment 
5) do not link together in a transparent way. For the Hypothesis development, much of the 
theorising is reasonably well done but there is a missing step that synthesises the extant 
research and then presents the hypothesis in a way that clearly leads from the literature. It 
may be that the line of argumentation needs to be made via logic than references. For the 
results and discussion, this is better as you have tried to address the what and the how but 
this is unlinked to the results and I had to refer back to the results. By bringing the results in 
you can make this link clearer and allow the discussion to flow more naturally. I don't think 
that these changes are huge and should lead to a manuscript that flows more clearly. Good 
luck! 
 
Thank you for your kind words regarding our manuscript. We apologise that the development 
of our hypothesis and the discussion of our results lacked sufficient clarity. We have 
thoroughly revised both these sections. 
 
The logical flow of the theoretical arguments for our hypotheses is now much improved (see 
pp13-17).  The theoretical arguments for HI centres around the interplay between the explicit 
knowledge shared via the certification process (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009), and the tacit 
experiences shared in partner communities (Anand et al., 2002). At the same time, 
certification reduces information asymmetry between partners (King et al., 2005) which 
reduces free-riding, enhances voluntarism and reciprocity, thus increasing the likelihood of 
sharing tacit knowledge in the community (Mathwick et al., 2008).  
 
For H2 we argue that partner communities operate as a type of social control which buffer 
against, and neutralize, a partner's potentially negative sentiments and adverse reactions to 
the certification process (Brown et al., 2016). At the same time certification, which signal that 
the partners ‘belong to the same club’ increases their credibility thus supporting the 
relationship-building in partner communities (Grabner-Krauter, 2009; Markus and Agres, 
2000) increasing its effectiveness.  
 
We agree that the discussion of our results should have been clearer and more precise. 
Therefore we have also thoroughly rewritten this section with clearer signposting back to the 
results (see pp 26-28). To make the discussion flow more naturally we first discuss the results 
related to hypothesis 1, then hypothesis 2, before going on to drill down into the results of the 
2-way interactions to provide greater insight into the role of certification and partner 
communities.  
 
By making these changes we believe we have further improved the manuscript and made our 
theoretical contribution much more clear. Hopefully you concur.  
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Governing Embedded Partner Networks: 
Certification and Partner Communities in the IT Sector 
 
Abstract  
Purpose 
The complexity of supplier-partner networks in the Information Technology (IT) 
sector where large suppliers utilize thousands of authorized partners, requires that 
organizations reconsider their approach to governing and managing the relationships 
involved. Traditional dyadic approaches to governance are likely to prove inadequate. This 
paper investigates the relationship between network governance mechanisms and relationship 
performance. Specifically, we examine the contingent effect of certification of partners and 
the use of partner communities (as formal and informal mechanisms of network governance, 
respectively), on complex and embedded networks of relationships. 
Design/methodology/approach 
A model examining the effect of formal and informal network governance on the 
relationship between embeddedness (structural and relational) and relationship performance 
is developed. Data was collected from a sample of partners of leading IT suppliers in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. Three-way interactions assess the contingent effect of 
certification and partner communities on the relationship between embeddedness and 
relational performance.  
Findings  
Results support the use of a combination of certification and partner communities to 
strengthen the link between network structure (structural embeddedness) and relational 
embeddedness, as well as relationship performance. Certification requires the sharing of 
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explicit knowledge with partners whereas partner communities aid the creation and 
dissemination of more tacit, contextual knowledge. Furthermore, partner communities 
reinforce positive perceptions of fairness in suppliers’ network management practices, 
overcoming any perceptions of lock-in or coercive control that certification may suggest. 
Practical implications 
Certification, despite all its procedural and reputational benefits, damages partner 
relationships and needs to be supported by partner communities, which themselves show 
particularly strong benefits in enhancing network relationships. 
Originality/value 
Despite the emerging prevalence of certification and partner communities in business-
to-business relationships, to date there is a paucity of research on their effects on partner 
relationships and performance. Organizations with an extensive network of similar partners 
may suffer network overload. This research shows that such organizations can manage their 
partner network more effectively through network governance mechanisms, thereby 
addressing the challenge of overload.  
 
Keywords: Governance; Partner Networks; Certification; Communities   
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Introduction 
For large Information Technology (IT) suppliers, such as Microsoft, Cisco, IBM and 
Oracle, the creation of value depends largely on vertical networks and effective management 
of relationships with independent partners (de Ruyter et al., 2001; Gilliland, 2003). The 
vertical network consists of a lead supplier organization and numerous smaller partner 
organizations through which it sells and delivers IT hardware (e.g. computers, servers and 
network equipment) and/or software products. All major activities and key decisions are 
managed by the supplier; still its success in the market is heavily influenced by the efforts of 
its partners. For instance, two-thirds of the total revenue of SAP, one of the world’s largest 
inter-enterprise software suppliers, is driven by their worldwide channel partner network 
(Whiting, 2013), whilst Cisco, a leading supplier of networking and telecommunications 
hardware, derives over 80% of its revenues through its 55,000 partners (Kalyanam and Brar, 
2009). Beyond their direct impact on revenues and margins, these channel partners are a 
critical source of market intelligence, co-creation and market development for suppliers 
(Sarker et al., 2012). However, despite the importance of these relationships there is a lack of 
research to help managers (Lee and Joshi, 2011). 
Despite their wide-spread popularity in the IT sector, organizations are increasingly 
dissatisfied with the return on investment from channel partner programs (Neumann et al., 
2015). Furthermore it is often suggested that more effective relationship management and 
engagement with these partners is needed to alleviate their mistrust in how suppliers engage 
and manage partners (Andrews, 2013). Evidence suggests that the scale and complexity of 
partner networks, in the IT sector, requires a governance approach that is more nuanced than 
the dyadic, control-based approaches traditionally adopted (Zarges, 2012). We assert that 
there is a clear managerial need to explore the impact of governance approaches that are 
focused on the management of the network, rather than multiple individual relationships.   
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We examine recent theorizing on relationship governance to address this need. The 
term governance refers to the processes that are needed to structure economic and social 
exchanges, and the control mechanisms used to maintain them (Heide, 1994). As such, 
governance has an important impact on the performance of inter-organizational relationships 
(Jap and Ganesan, 2000). Existing research on governance mechanisms in vertical channels 
has focused primarily on the management of individual relationships. However, it has been 
argued that this approach may not be effectively scalable, as relationships are typically 
embedded in more complex multi-stakeholder networks (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Zu and 
Kaynak, 2012). Partners in these networks can be managed more effectively through 
governance mechanisms aimed at enhancing the network as a whole thereby avoiding the 
challenges associated with trying to manage many partners individually (Dagnino et al., 
2016).  
IT suppliers have recently advanced two contrasting mechanisms to collectively 
govern their large-scale partner networks: (1) the certification of partners; and, (2) the 
establishment of partner communities via online interactive forums. Certification, which is 
the standardized and formalized process of validating the authenticity of a partner’s resources 
and knowledge, legitimises partners relative to the network (Graffin and Ward, 2010). Partner 
communities are a form of network of practice where the social structure of the community 
and partners’ concern for reputation within the community serve to informally govern the 
network (Capaldo, 2014; Wasko and Faraj, 2005). 
While exploring both mechanisms, the context in which the relationship is embedded 
must be considered also as channel partners are embedded within a broader social network 
that will influence how they conduct and manage their cooperative relationships (Gnyawali 
and Madhavan, 2001). There are two main classifications of embeddedness - structural 
embeddedness and relational embeddedness (Kim, 2014). Broadly summarised, structural 
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embeddedness focuses on who knows whom, whereas relational embeddedness captures how 
well actors know each other (Moran, 2005). Specifically, structural embeddedness relates to 
the specific configuration of channel partners selected by the supplier and highlights the 
importance of framing partners as being embedded in larger networks rather than in isolation 
(Choi and Kim, 2008). Relational embeddedness refers to the closeness of bonds and shared 
goals between partners, and the expectation of reciprocity and relationship continuation 
(Carey et al., 2011; Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001). Currently, there is little agreement in 
the literature pertaining to the compatibility of formal and informal governance mechanisms, 
i.e., whether they operate more effectively as substitutes or complements, within the context 
of network embeddedness.  
The aim of this paper is to explore how certified partners in the IT sector are governed 
by their suppliers and the effect this has on their performance. We present a theoretical model 
that examines how the structural configuration of the partner network (the level of structural 
embeddedness) impacts relational performance, both directly and indirectly through relational 
embeddedness. Taking a plural form perspective on governance, we assert that partner 
certification and partner communities (formal and informal governance respectively), 
reinforce the impact of structural embeddedness on the strength of the relationship (relational 
embeddedness) between supplier and partner and subsequently on relationship performance. 
We contend that when certifications are combined with the inf rmality of a partner 
community, they have a complementary effect. Although the certification process can foster 
negative sentiments when perceived as a form of coercive control, or monitoring of partners, 
it does generate explicit knowledge for the partners whereas a partner community provides 
more tacit contextual knowledge and reinforces the social norms which bind partners. 
Furthermore, partner communities reinforce positive perceptions of fairness in suppliers’ 
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network management practices overcoming any perceptions of lock-in that certification may 
suggest.  
Frame of Reference 
Governance of partner networks in the IT sector 
For large IT hardware and software suppliers the design and installation of complex 
solutions are typically led by value adding partners (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009; Lee and Joshi, 
2011). Most suppliers manage thousands of geographically dispersed small to medium sized 
partners (Gillilan, 2003). Cognizant of the importance of channel partners, suppliers are 
investing heavily in the management and maintenance of these strategic relationships. For 
instance, HP invested $1.5 billion in the launch of its PartnerOne program and recently IBM 
re-designed PartnerWorld University to educate their 155,000 partners in critical sales and 
technical skills. These partner programs are used to support specific partner segments, offer 
online training for professional advancement and certification tracks, and facilitate peer-to-
peer knowledge and social exchange (Pelser et al., 2015). However organizations are 
increasingly dissatisfied with their returns from partner programs and require guidance in the 
management of these critical relationships (Lee and Joshi, 2011; Neumann et al., 2015). 
In IT supplier-partner networks suppliers face the daunting task of governing a 
network of tens of thousands of partners. Partnership governance mechanisms are the means 
by which a supplier attempts to align their partners’ practices with its goals (Heide, 1994). 
This can be achieved through either regulating the partners’ practices using formal 
governance mechanisms or influencing their behavior using more informal mechanisms. 
Existing theorized approaches to governance work at the level of the individual relationship 
and may not be scalable as the number of partners increase (Provan and Kenis, 2008). In 
addition, individualised contracts and the establishment of interpersonal contacts does not 
account for the partners as part of an ecosystem. As a result organizations with an extensive 
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network of interconnected partners may suffer network overload, which can curtail the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the network (Dagnino et al., 2016). Rather IT suppliers can 
manage their partners more effectively through specific governance mechanisms that aim to 
enhance the performance of both the individual partners and the network as a whole.  
Therefore IT suppliers have introduced two contrasting mechanisms to manage their 
networks - the certification of partners and the establishment of online partner communities. 
Despite the emerging prevalence of these two network governance mechanisms there is a 
paucity of research on their effects on partner relationships and relationship performance.  
Certification is the standardized and formalized process of validating the authenticity 
of the partner resources and skills (Modi and Mabert, 2007). Certification governance 
includes two fundamental elements - a codified set of standards and a certification system 
that allows organizations to communicate the attainment of these standards (King at al., 
2005). To be “certified” in the IT sector, partners are required to have a number of pre-
defined resources, a minimum acceptable level of technical knowledge and must undertake 
training in the products of the supplier (Gilliland, 2003; Palotie 2017; Wang and Philips, 
2012).
1
 This is backed up by competence testing. Cisco’s experience is that training that is 
not validated with competence testing is not effective (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009). 
Certifications are particularly effective at the network level as they allow suppliers to 
strengthen a large number of their partner’s capabilities efficiently (Kalyanam and Brar, 
2009).  
Being certified signals to the marketplace that a certain level of competence has been 
reached in the supplier’s products, underlining the brand promise of the supplier (Kalyanam 
and Brar, 2009; Kirmani and Rao, 2000). Certification programs usually have tier levels 
                                                
1 This differs from the certification of quality management systems e.g. ISO 9001 which 
typically focuses on processes and are managed by third party organizations independent of 
the parties involved in the relationship. We thank the anonymous reviewer for this 
clarification. 
Page 11 of 50 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Operations and Production M
anagem
ent
8 
representing partners’ capabilities. For example, SAS (a provider of analytics software) has 
silver, gold and platinum partners (SAS, 2017). Advancement form one tier to the next is 
determined by the number of employees who have passed SAS’s certification exams and the 
taking of specific training courses. These partners can further differentiate themselves in the 
marketplace by obtaining specialization badges representing specific competencies  
IT suppliers provide online partner directories listing all certified partners and 
detailing their capabilities. This leads to positive reputational and legitimacy effects with end 
customers and other partners. Partners use certification information to identify other partners 
who share similar standards and with whom they may want to work with (Wang and Philips, 
2012). Partners’ desire to acquire legitimacy sees certification act as a governance 
mechanism over the network (Capaldo 2014; Provan and Kenis, 2008). Achieving legitimacy 
in the market is the primary reason for partners to pursue certification (Lee and Joshi, 2011).  
To complement the certification process, and acknowledging that online communities 
can enhance B2B relationships (Andersen, 2005; Spralls et al., 2011), companies such as 
Intel, HP and Oracle have introduced online communities of practice. These partner 
communities play an important role due to the guidance offered, knowledge available, and 
technical support that partners can leverage (Bone et al., 2014; Graham and Hardaker, 2000). 
For example Microsoft Dynamics partner community has been set-up to allow partners to 
interact with each other; to post and answer questions; to get help from experts; and, to access 
useful videos and ‘how-to’ articles (Microsoft, 2017). Partners are encouraged to post regular 
support and how-to blogs on the community forum. Blog articles are seen as an effective way 
to help answer questions, give tips, provide advice and highlight the expertise of community 
members. 
These communities have now become the main repository for information regarding a 
supplier’s products, along with demonstrations and relevant training. The online message 
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boards and chat rooms of the communities help to establish flows of information and 
facilitate on-going communication (Wuyts and Geyskens, 2005). Partner communities bring 
individuals, who have commonalities around a shared practice, together to exchange 
knowledge and expertise in order to improve and generate economies of expertise, whilst also 
collectively generating solutions to shared problems (Spralls et al., 2011; Wasko and Faraj, 
2000). Suppliers often encourage the development of regional sub-communities, or user 
groups based around specific competency areas, which further increases the relevance of the 
community to individual partners.  
The communication and knowledge sharing in these partner communities inspires 
confidence, generates a willingness to collaborate for mutual benefit and fosters commitment 
(Matzat, 2004; Wasko and Faraj, 2005). Cisco publicizes partner-led solutions in its online 
community and provides rewards for partner-led solutions as community building measures 
(Kalyanam and Brar, 2009). To encourage engagement with the community, contributors to 
Cisco’s community can be awarded VIP status or elected to the Hall of Fame, based on the 
quality of their contribution and influence within the community (Cisco, 2017). Badges and 
awards are also given for those who provide leadership and commitment to their peers. 
Partners who make a significant contribution to the Microsoft Dynamics community 
(answering questions and participating in discussions) are asked to play a moderation role 
whereby they monitor and maintain the quality of the interaction (Microsoft, 2017). These are 
valued by the community as they are seen as independent voices who provide different 
perspectives. Other members of the community recognize community moderators as experts 
who have been promoted in recognition of their passion for the community.  
Via community engagement, the normative influences of the community become 
ingrained, reflected in voluntarism, trust, concern for reputation and reciprocity (Mathwick et 
al., 2008; Capaldo 2014; Wasko and Faraj, 2005). Through the positive reinforcement of 
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shared values, and the development of a cohesive social structure within the community, 
participants’ behavior is directly affected (Geyskens et al., 1999; Jones et al., 1997). It for 
these reasons that Grewal et al. (2010) position the establishment of network communities as 
an important informal governance mechanism.  
Embedded networks  
In examining governance effectiveness, we acknowledge that relationships do not 
exist in a vacuum but rather that they are embedded within a complex network of social, 
economic and hierarchical structures (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). The supplier-partner 
context positions partners as embedded in a network of other partners that have been selected 
and certified by the supplier for whom they are acting as a sales agent. Through the 
embeddedness perspective we are able to consider how partners are effectively coordinated 
and managed by their supplier in order to improve relational performance.   
Following Granovetter (1992) we conceptualise embeddedness at two levels: the 
structural level and the relational level. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) define structural 
embeddedness as the impersonal configuration of linkages between people or units, whilst 
Choi and Kim (2008) assert that structural embeddedness is the framing of partners in 
relation to the network in which they reside. We align with the latter definition as it enables a 
more rigorous examination of the complexity of the context that we are studying – that of 
large supplier-partner networks. In the IT sector, we contend that an organization’s 
performance depends on how it environs itself with other companies. In line with Burt’s 
(1992) structural hole approach, this conceptualization of structural embeddedness, also 
allows us to consider the impact of dependency between suppliers and partners in the network 
and examine the effects of efforts made by suppliers to structurally plan the positioning of 
their network. Structural embeddedness can shape the informational and reputational benefits 
flowing to actors within the network, and develop their competitive potential (Kim, 2014). 
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The configuration of the partners in a network and the way in which they interact with one 
another influence the flow of resources, status and benefits that accrue between them and 
their supplier. 
The second type of embeddedness, relational embeddedness, refers to the intensity 
and intimacy of bonds organizations have forged with each other through a history of 
interactions (Granovetter, 1992; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Mutual trust, respect, 
commitment and a sense of obligation shared between actors are the central tenets of 
relational embeddedness (Lawson et al., 2008; Moran, 2005; Rindfleisch and Moorman, 
2001). As a form of credible assurance for both parties, relational embeddedness offers 
confidence and reduces the fear of opportunism in the exchange process (Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Kim, 2014). When two actors are relationally embedded, both parties are more trusting 
and more familiar and will have increased opportunity to learn from one another. This 
informed position will, in turn, increase both actors willingness to share information and 
resources, and cooperate for mutual gain. It follows that relational embeddedness improves 
relationship performance by reducing the expectation of opportunistic behavior in the 
network, helping partners and suppliers to more effectively combine knowledge across the 
network (Kim, 2014). 
Conceptual Model and Hypotheses Development 
We hypothesize that a base model of structural embeddedness – relational 
embeddedness – relationship performance (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Kim, 2014) will 
be affected by the governance mechanisms that partners are subjected to (see Figure 1).  
*** Figure 1 About here *** 
Research has shown the positive impact of structural embeddedness on performance 
(Moran, 2005; Kim, 2014; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Past studies have also shown that 
structural embeddedness is positively related to relational embeddedness (Li et al., 2014; 
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Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Roden and Lawson, 2014). Furthermore, relational embeddedness 
which manifests itself in trustworthiness, promotes cooperative behavior and resource 
sharing, and partially mediates the relationship between partner network structure and 
relationship performance (Carey et al., 2011; Kim, 2014). As these relationships are already 
established in the literature we do not present formal hypotheses, but position these 
relationships as the base model upon which governance operates. We then focus on the 
moderating effects of certification, a formal approach to governance, and informal 
governance, embodied in a partner community, on the relationship between embeddedness 
and relational performance. 
Initially, the predominant perspective in governance research was that formal and 
informal governance mechanisms work more effectively as substitutes of each other (e.g. 
Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998). More recently, this assertion has been 
challenged by the plural form perspective, which contends that both types of governance 
offer discernible benefits when used in conjunction with one another, and should thus be 
considered complementary (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Li et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2006). 
However there is still a need to investigate the relative substitutive or complementarily effect 
of alternative governance mechanisms, especially across different relationship contexts 
(Wacker et al., 2016). In addition, the conceptual development of network governance 
mechanisms is still in the early stages. We argue that the performance of partners can be 
bolstered by purposefully combining certification with the establishment of a partner 
community. As we now explain, partner communities can enhance the usefulness of 
knowledge generated by certification and can offset some of the limitations of certification on 
relational embeddedness. 
Moderation of the Structural Embeddedness-Relationship Performance Path 
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Certification and partner communities can help strengthen the relationship between 
partner network structure and relationship performance by enhancing the flow of both explicit 
and tacit knowledge to the partner. Moreover, the pattern is likely to be similar to that 
suggested by Bell et al. (2009): Certification, as a formal control mechanism, is likely to have 
a greater role in safeguarding the investments that enable the flow of explicit knowledge, 
whereas the partnership community (as informal governance) is more critical to the diffusion 
of tacit knowledge. Thus, their role is complementary. 
With respect to explicit information, the certification process sees suppliers establish 
requirements for partner organizations to achieve a certain level of proficiency or possess a 
specific knowledge set across their line of products. The standards applied, coupled with the 
formal auditing procedures involved, offer a template for enabling the transfer of explicit 
knowledge across the network (Li et al., 2010) thus strengthening the impact of structural 
embeddedness on relationship performance. Certification allows a supplier to formally 
increase the capabilities of a significant number of partners (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009) and 
can thus raise the effectiveness of the whole network.  
Within the context of supplier-partner networks, online communities have been 
shown to be very effective in providing guidance, relevant information and technical support 
to partners (Graham and Hardaker, 2000). This may be partly due to the fact that these 
communities allow partners to access knowledge that does not reside in their own 
organization but resides within the network as a whole (Anand et al., 2002). Partners in the 
network have overlapping expertise and technological knowledge and therefore will be able 
to benefit from the sharing of information and experiences through partner communities, 
generating economies of expertise in the process (Jones et al., 1997; Spralls et al., 2011) and 
enabling partners to solve problems more efficiently (Bone et al., 2015). Thus partner 
communities will also increase the effectiveness of the partners in the supplier’s network. 
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However, we contend that certification and partner communities work to 
synergistically enhance the performance of the network in two ways. First the relative 
openness and informality of partner communities encourages behavioral transparency and 
trust development which enables the free-flow of information and problem solving across the 
network. Complementing this, certification helps partners achieve legitimacy and status 
(Suchman, 1995; Graffin and Ward, 2010) by signalling the achievement of a level of 
knowledge (Brunsson et al., 2012). Thus certification reduces information asymmetries 
between partners (King et al., 2005), provides protection against free-riding and enables 
smoother communication flows. Reducing information asymmetry between partners 
enhances voluntarism and reciprocity in communities (Mathwick et al., 2008). Together 
certification and partner communities set the stage for the smoother generation and flow of 
knowledge enhancing relationship performance.  
Second, partner communities are important for the sharing of tacit knowledge 
enhancing the usefulness of the certified explicit knowledge partners possess. This is because 
a partner community can be a powerful source of information around shared, unspoken rules 
for behavior which strengthen the capabilities of partners. Similar to Jap’s (1999) social 
interaction routines, partner communities provide a forum for partners and suppliers to share 
trouble-shooting tips and hands-on experience (Anand et al., 2002). Even though the 
participating organizations may be direct or indirect competitors, informal and reciprocal 
knowledge exchanges between individuals are valued and sustained over time because the 
sharing of knowledge is an important aspect of being a member of the community (Bouty, 
2000; Mathwick et al., 2008). The community establishes a common language to convey 
complex information and specifies shared tacit rules for behavior (Jones et al., 1997).  
Explicit knowledge exchange is most efficient when community members have 
similar narratives and contextual framing (Wasko and Faraj, 2000). Tacit knowledge enables 
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partners to overcome cognitive barriers, and thus assimilate and make full use of explicit 
knowledge (created by the certification process). The partner community also allows partners 
to address any misunderstandings that they may have accrued during its acquisition. It is the 
interaction of tacit and explicit knowledge that is important in creating a higher and richer 
level of knowledge enhancing the usefulness of both (Nonaka, 1994).  
Thus we assert that: 
H1: Governance through certification and partner communities synergistically and 
positively moderate the relationship between partner network structure and 
relationship performance.  
Moderation of the Structural-Relational-Relationship Performance Path 
The implications of certification and partner communities on the relational aspects of 
the base model are less clear. Research has questioned the value of certification for supplier 
performance (Krause et al., 2007). On one hand, the formalized processes associated with 
certification sets standards and routine procedures for every partner to follow and abide by, 
thus creating less confusion and reducing divergent interpretations of similar activities 
(Kalyanam and Brar, 2009). However, Blonska et al (2013) showed that certification has a 
negative impact on the quality of the relationship. Such a formalized, one-size fits all means 
of governance can aggravate asymmetries in channel perceptions and information flows, 
causing resentment and actually reducing coordination (Gilliland et al., 2010). This points to 
a darker side of certification where it may be perceived by some as a coercive influence 
attempt. Coercive influence mechanisms apply direct pressure by communicating the possible 
negative consequences of non-compliance to encourage specific behaviors (Frazier and Rody, 
1991).  
Certification, whilst it may confer positive informational benefits, can be viewed as a 
form of unilateral control, in favour of the supplier, limiting partner autonomy and increasing 
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conflict, often leading to defensive or opportunistic behavior (Brown et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the monitoring aspect of certification may signal supplier distrust and lack of 
confidence in the partners’ attributes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), impeding cooperative 
behavior (Huang et al., 2014). These factors may mean that certification can destabilize the 
relationship suggesting a limit to the impact of certification on relationship embeddedness 
and performance. 
Conversely, an effective partner community increases the perception of transparency 
and fosters positive perceptions of fairness in suppliers’ network management practices. As a 
governance mechanism, it is targeted towards increasing total value rather than share of value 
(Burkert et al., 2012). The community provides the opportunity and motivation to strengthen 
the interactions, through improved communication and understanding of the other partners in 
the network (Yu et al., 2006). Relational embeddedness is tightly linked with the norm of 
helping each other on online networks (Matzat, 2004). Even the sole act of sharing 
information in online communities increases relationship commitment (Weber, 2001). Still, 
the social support available through these communities has an even more significant effect on 
commitment (Mathwick et al., 2008). The community creates a convergence of expectations 
through socialization (Jones et al., 1997). When collaborations are ingrained in a cohesive 
social partner community, the partners’ concern for reputation within the community, acts as 
a governance mechanism (Capaldo, 2014). The community supports embedded social 
relationships that help mitigate the risks associated with opportunistic behavior (Grewal et al., 
2017). This not only strengthens existing relational embeddedness but can also directly 
improve the knowledge benefits of collaboration, as well as performance more broadly 
(Wasko and Faraj, 2000). 
However, the benefits of certification and partner communities on the relationship can 
be further understood by considering their synergistic effects. Whilst evidence has shown that 
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simultaneously investing in relational ties between actors, and imposing evaluation and 
certification expectations, creates ambiguity and a disconnect in the relationship (Wagner, 
2010), we suggest that the socialization, information transparency, knowledge sharing and 
troubleshooting opportunities offered in partner communities, offset potential adverse 
reactions to certification (such as perceptions of lock-in, control and monitoring).  
Partner communities elevate the efficiency of certification through the sense of 
“community” created while at the same time countering perceptual consequences of the 
monitoring efforts of the supplier (Bell et al., 2009). In this way, we contend that partner 
communities operate as a type of social control which buffer against, and neutralize, a 
partner's potentially negative sentiments and adverse reactions to the certification process 
(Brown et al., 2016). The relationships fostered in these communities encourage social 
cohesion, with the ongoing interaction serving to support and reinforce norms of behavior, 
which effectively act as a self-enforcing safeguard (Heide, 1994). Supporting this, 
Osmonbekov et al. (2016) found that formal governance in the form of contracts exasperates 
a partner’s perceived inequity whereas social enforcement, captured as norms of behavior, 
reduces it. 
At the same time certification can support the effectiveness of the partner community. 
Certification allows for a specific form of trust to develop in the online partner communities; 
the trust of belonging to the same organizational network (Grabner-Krauter, 2009). Spralls et 
al. (2011) found the degree to which partners have confidence in the reliability and integrity 
of other network partners a key element of an online community’s ability to build closer 
relationships with partners. Similarly, Markus and Agre (2000) state that for virtual 
organizations in the open-source context, “a large ‘community of practice’ with a strong, 
shared technical professionalism” is needed. Certification, by definition, is the affirmation of 
such technical professionalism which reinforces partners’ commitment to the community 
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enhancing its effectiveness. Thus, while certification on its own may have a dark side, when 
used in conjunction of a partner community, it will strengthen the benefits of the latter.  
We hypothesize: 
H2: Certification and partner community governance synergistically and positively 
moderates the relationships between, (a) partner network structure and relationship 
embeddedness, and (b) relationship embeddedness and relationship performance. 
Methodology 
Measures 
To test the conceptual model a survey was carried out. Where possible, scales from 
previous research were used and adapted to the specific context. The scales for the two 
governance mechanisms were developed specifically for this research. Items for the scales 
were based on the literature reviewed. Exploratory interviews, lasting 60-90 minutes, were 
conducted with a group of 11 senior managers from a mixture of supplier and partner firms. 
All practitioners were experts with considerable experience in managing the affairs of partner 
organizations for at least two years in this field. Their feedback helped us revise the 
questionnaire, shape the conceptual model and purify the items. Their interpretation of the 
items in the measures helped ensure the content and face validity of each measure. The final 
questionnaire was pretested with a holdout sample of 31 managers from partner firms which 
helped further purify the measures and indicated that the items in the final survey instrument 
were reliable and valid (Gilliland and Bello, 2002). All scale items were assessed on 7-point 
Likert scales (see the appendix for a complete list of measures).  
Certification governance was based on the existing research on certification (Blonska 
et al., 2013; Krause et al., 2007; Modi and Mabert, 2007) and refined via interviews with 
managers. This scale was assessed on four items: our supplier requires us to have substantial 
resources (i.e capital, number of employees) in place before being granted certified status; 
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requires our employees to demonstrate a high level of knowledge (e.g via examinations, test, 
qualifications etc.) before being certified; requires our employees to undertake specified 
training; our supplier regularly reviews our certification status.2 The scale reflects the 
elements commonly associated with certification programmes in the IT sector, a resource or 
capability requirement; a training requirement; a formalized process of assessment, and a 
monitoring programme (Gilliland, 2003; Kalyanam and Brar, 2009). 
Partner community governance refers to the totality of effort exerted by the supplier 
to create an online community of practice which allows partners to interact, collaborate on 
problem solving, exchange knowledge and expertise, and form cooperative connections 
(Graham and Hardaker et al., 2000; Mathwick et al. 2008; Wasko and Faraj, 2005). This scale 
was based on the scale for online community building from Grewal et al. (2010) and 
interviews with managers which stressed the importance of online communities for 
information sharing and for discussions between peers for troubleshooting. Partner 
community governance was measured using four items that assessed the extent to which 
partners were encouraged to interact and share information amongst each other; the existence 
of discussion forums to enable information sharing; the value partners place on discussions 
with other partners, and the belief that partners were cooperative rather than competitive.3 
Relationship performance is defined as a channel member’s evaluation of the 
economic outcomes that flow from the relationship with its partner (Geyskens et al., 1999). 
Relationship performance was measured using a three item scale developed by Nyaga et al. 
(2010).  
                                                
2 One item - certification level is a key influence amongst customers in our market - was 
removed after feedback from managers. This were not deemed to be part of the governance 
aspects of certification. 
3
 One item - there is good sense of shared belonging amongst the partners of our supplier – 
was dropped after the pre-test. 
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Relationship embeddedness, which reflects the closeness of bonds between the 
partner and their supplier, was captured using a four-item scale from Rindfleisch and 
Moorman (2001).  
Partner network structure is the extent to which a partner feels it is deeply and fairly 
embedded in a network of partners. Building on the work of Anderson and Weitz (1992), 
partner network structure was measured by 4 items that assess partner’s perception of their 
supplier’s effectiveness in planning and managing its network of partners, designating their 
territories and avoiding direct competition between partners. 
In addition, a number of variables that may influence relationship performance were 
included in the tested models. The tier level of the partner was measured on a 3-point scale 
(entry/foundation-, mid-, and top-tier level partners) as this often determines the level of 
support a partner receives (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009). Partners were asked to indicate if the 
proportion of their total revenues’ from the specified supplier was greater or less than 50% as 
a measure of the partner’s dependency on the supplier which may affect business to business 
relationships (Gilliland and Bello, 2002). The length of the relationship and the size of the 
partner organization (measured using number of employees) were also controlled for as these 
can affect embeddedness and relationship performance (Kim, 2014; Poppo and Zhou, 2014). 
The type of product (hardware versus software) was also controlled as the relative importance 
of certification and online communities of practice may increase with more information 
intense products (Spralls et al., 2011). 
Sampling 
The empirical part of this study was carried out via a key informant survey. Partners 
were identified from websites of leading IT companies4. Data was collected from the United 
                                                
4
 The Forbes2000 list of top 2000 ranking public companies was used to identify leading IT 
companies (www.Forbes.com). The ranking is based on a mix of four metrics: sales, profit, 
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Kingdom and Ireland. Partner directories on the IT firm’s websites were used to identify 
appropriate partners and contact information. Where possible, direct contact with firms was 
made to check the identity of the most appropriate informant. Informants needed to have had 
experience with the supplier for at least one year and be in a position whereby they dealt with 
the supplier organization directly. In the cases in which such a key informant was not 
identifiable, the firm was excluded from the sample. 720 certified partners were identified. 
The final questionnaire was pretested with a holdout sample of 31 managers from partner 
firms. To gauge the ability of the informants to report on the variables of interest, follow-up 
interviews of informants were conducted. These interviews verified that the approach taken 
was able to identify suitably knowledgeable informants (Gilliland and Bello, 2002). The 
interviews were used to ascertain key informants’ interpretation of the items in the measures, 
to ensure content validity of each measure and construct equivalence.  
In total 151 complete responses were received, representing a response rate of 21%. 
The average length of experience with the supplier was 3 years. 41% of the partners had been 
in a relationship with their supplier for more than five years. Out of the completed surveys, 
61% of the partners had less than 100 employees and 21% had between 100 and 500 
employees. To assess non-response bias, early and late respondents were compared 
(Armstrong and Overton, 1977). The results of t-tests revealed that there is no significant 
difference on the constructs, or on demographic variables such as number of employees 
between the two groups indicating that non-response bias does not pose a significant problem 
for our research. 
Analysis 
Analysis and assessment of the psychometric properties of the measurement model 
followed procedures commonly employed in the literature. Exploratory factor analysis was 
                                                                                                                                                  
assets and market value. Firms were excluded if they were found not to employ certified 
partners.  
Page 25 of 50 International Journal of Operations and Production Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Operations and Production M
anagem
ent
22 
conducted on all manifest variables to provide evidence of discriminant validity. The analysis 
provided a correctly loading solution. Harman's single factor test was used to assess common 
method bias. The factor accounted for less than half of the total variance (38% of 77%). To 
further validate the measurement model confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS 23.0 was 
undertaken. For a 5-factor model the model fit indices are χ2 = 204.6, χ2/df = 1.64, CFI = 
0.95, RMSEA = 0.06 which suggests the measurement model is acceptable (Hair et al., 
2014).  
Following Sumo et al. (2016) PLS-SEM was employed rather than covariance-based 
modelling (CB-SEM) due to the complexity of our model. The inclusion of 2-way and 3-way 
interaction terms increases the complexity of the model. When there are a large number of 
items per latent variable, as in the case of product indicator interaction terms, CB-SEM 
increases the total number of parameter estimates, possibly leading to model identification 
and convergence issues (Peng and Lai, 2012). Compared to CB-SEM techniques, model 
complexity does not pose a severe restriction because PLS modelling only estimates a subset 
of parameters at any moment (Wetzels et al., 2009). This leads to a successful estimate of the 
factor loadings and structural paths for each individual subset and PLS-SEM is suggested as a 
valid alternative to CB-SEM (Peng and Lai, 2012; Reinartz et al., 2009). PLS thus readily 
accommodates complex relationships in the structural model and it does so effectively with a 
relatively small sample size in comparison to CB-SEM (Sarstedt et al., 2016). In addition, the 
model included a number of single-item control variables, which PLS-SEM (but not CB-
SEM) would process without identification problems (Hair et al., 2014). 
Coefficient α and composite reliability were calculated for each construct in the 
measurement model and were found to be greater than the recommended minimum of 0.6 for 
the first two measures, indicating acceptable reliability (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2014). 
Average variance extracted (AVE) for all latent variables was found to be above the 
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minimum of 0.5. The standardized loadings from the PLS-SEM model were acceptable 
providing evidence of convergent and discriminant validity (Chin, 1998). Discriminant 
validity was also assessed by examining whether each construct shared more variance with its 
measures than with other constructs in the model (Chin, 1998). To this end, AVE was always 
greater than the highest shared variance with the other factors, indicating discriminant 
validity. The results demonstrate the reliability and validity of the measurement model. 
Correlations between all latent variables are shown in Table 1 and the loadings are shown in 
the Appendix.  
*** Table 1 About Here *** 
The results for the hypothesized structural model are shown in Table 2. A hierarchical 
approach to variable inclusion was followed where first a direct effects model was tested 
(Model 1). This was the base model. Next, the two-way interactions between all relevant 
variables were added to create model 2. Last, this was followed by the insertion of the 3-way 
interactions to create model 3. To test for the interaction effects in the model, interaction 
terms were developed using an orthogonalizing residual product indicator approach as 
follows: First, product terms were created between all indicators of the relevant constructs. 
Second, the product terms were regressed on all the indicators and third, the residuals were 
used as indicators of the interaction term (Henseler and Chin, 2010). This limits 
multicollinearity amongst the interaction terms. Checks revealed that the variance inflation 
factors of the latent variables in the structural model are less than 2, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not an issue in this data (Hair et al., 2014).  
*** Table 2 About Here *** 
To assess the quality of the model, a goodness-of-fit (GOF) measure 
(average	R	 ∗ average	AVE) was calculated. Assuming a large effect size for R2 (0.26) and 
a cut-off value of AVE of 0.70, a comparison GOF value is 0.42 (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). 
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The goodness of fit calculated was 0.55, indicating a good fit. In addition, Q
2
 was calculated 
for the outcome variables to assess predictive validity. This was 0.22 for relationship 
embeddedness and 0.42 for relationship performance. The fact that both of these were above 
zero indicates that the model has predictive relevance (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). 
Results 
According to the results in Table 2, partner network structure has a direct effect on 
relationship performance (β = 0.27)5. Partner network structure also has a strong positive 
impact on relationship embeddedness (β = 0.36), which in turn impacts relationship 
performance (β = 0.34). Together these show that relationship embeddedness partially 
mediates the relationship between partner network structure and relationship performance 
supporting the base model
6
. Partners embedded in a planned network structure accrue 
performance benefits both directly and through the trust, integrity and cooperation afforded to 
them through relational embeddedness.   
When we compare the 2-way interaction model (M2) to the direct model (M1): 
including the interaction terms, relationship embeddedness R2 increases from 0.25 to 0.36 
(∆R
2
 = 0.12, p < 0.00). The f
2
 of the interaction term is 0.17 suggesting a medium effect size 
(Chin et al., 2003; Cohen 1988). Similarly, for relationship performance, the increase in R2 
(∆R2 = 0.05, p = 0.01; f2 = 0.13) is significant with a medium effect.  
Similarly, the R2 for relationship embeddedness increases from 0.36 in a 2-way 
interaction model (M2) to 0.38 in a 3-way interaction model – M3 (∆R2 = 0.02, p = 0.03). 
The effect size (f
2
) of the interaction term is 0.03 suggesting a small effect. The increase in R
2
 
                                                
5 Research advocates the use of one-tailed test when testing directional and theory driven 
hypothesis (Cho and Abe, 2013; Phang et al. 2014). Therefore the 3-way interactions are 
tested using 1-tailed tests, else 2-tailed tests are employed. 
6 A Sobel test demonstrated the significance of mediation (t = 2.94, p < 0.00). When, we 
tested a model without the mediator, the relationship between partner network structure and 
relationship performance was substantially larger (β=0.41). 
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for relationship performance (∆R
2
 = 0.03, p < 0.01; f
2
 = 0.08) is significant with a small to 
medium effect. These results provide support for the plural view of governance.  
Significant interaction effects are also graphed in Figures 2 and 3. We followed a 
method prevalent in the literature (Aiken and West, 1991; Dawson, 2014). We used one 
standard deviation above and below the mean to capture high and low levels. When partner 
community governance is in place, certification can enhance the impact of partner network 
structure on relationship performance (β = 0.17), and vice-versa. This supports H1. However 
the results are starker. Both certification and partner community governance reduce the 
effectiveness of a partner network structure in driving relationship performance without the 
support of the other governance mechanism (Figure 2). It is the interplay of both certification 
and partner communities that lead to performance enhancements. 
*** Figures 2 & 3 About here *** 
The impact on the network structure – relationship embeddedness relationship is less 
straightforward. The significant three-way interaction (β = 0.14) supports H2a. Without 
certification, partner community has a limited effect on the extent to which partner network 
structure drives relationship embeddedness (Figure 3). Certification enhances the usefulness 
of a partner community. However the effects of partner communities go even further. 
Certification without partner communities has a negative effect on the network structure – 
relationship embeddedness relationship. The introduction of partner community governance 
can remove this detrimental effect. 
However the 3-way interaction between relationship embeddedness, certification and 
partner community on relationship performance is not significant (β = -0.10, n.s.) thus failing 
to provide support for H2b.  
Further understanding of the impact of certification and partner community can be 
uncovered by looking at the 2-way interaction model (M2). On its own certification 
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governance did not enhance the impact of structural embeddedness on relationship 
performance. Certification failed to moderate the relationship between partner network 
structure and relationship performance (β = -0.06, n.s.). The darker side of certification is 
evidenced by the negative moderation of the relationships between partner network structure 
and relationship embeddedness (β = -0.29); and between relationship embeddedness and 
relationship performance (β = -0.16). This suggests that the procedural effects of certification 
are not that pronounced and that the relationship effects are rather detrimental. 
Conversely, partner community fails to moderate the relationship between network 
structure and relationship performance (β = -0.08, n.s.). In contrast to certification 
governance, under partner community governance the network structure – relationship 
embeddedness – relationship performance relationship is strengthened. Partner community 
governance positively moderates the relationships between partner network structure and 
relationship embeddedness (β = 0.27); and between relationship embeddedness and 
relationship performance (β = 0.13). These results demonstrate the significant relational 
effects of partner communities. It is through this that relationship performance is enhanced.  
Discussion and Implications 
Motivated by IT suppliers, such as Microsoft and Oracle’s, struggle to manage their 
partner networks effectively, we set out to investigate the effects of two network governance 
mechanisms - namely certification and partner communities - on the link between 
embeddedness and relationship performance. 
With respect to our first hypothesis, we find strong support for the plural form of 
governance. In order to attain maximum benefits from their partners, suppliers should use 
both formal and informal governance mechanisms (i.e. certification and partner 
communities), to support their network. Suppliers in the IT sector faced with network 
overload as a result of attempting to control a dispersed network of tens of thousands of 
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partners have introduced two mechanism to maximise the performance of their partners. 
Suppliers certify their partners and provide communities of practice to support them. The 
governance of partners is a crucial issue in the IT sector, as suppliers have to adopt a broad 
overview of their entire structural network. It is not only the capabilities of the partners, but 
also their position in the market that determines performance. In addition, these partners are 
the final link between the suppliers and the consumers, putting them in a critical position. 
Thus, effective governance is critical in achieving desired results. 
The synergistic benefits of deploying both certification and partner communities, we 
contend, can be attributed to the interplay between the explicit knowledge shared via the 
certification process (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009), and the tacit experiences shared in partner 
communities (Anand et al., 2002). This tacit knowledge provides a narrative and contextual 
framing that enables partners to overcome cognitive barriers, assimilate and make full use of 
explicit knowledge. At the same time, certification reduces information asymmetry between 
partners (King et al., 2005) which reduces free-riding, enhances voluntarism and reciprocity, 
thus increasing the likelihood of sharing tacit knowledge in the community (Mathwick et al., 
2008). Thus together partner communities and certification enhance the relationship between 
structural embeddedness and relational performance.  
We report support for the argument that certification and partner communities jointly 
and positively moderate the relationship between partner network structure and relational 
embeddedness (H2a). This suggests that certification and partner communities elevate each 
other’s benefits and helps develop a stronger bond between partners and their supplier. On 
one hand, partner communities complement certifications by creating a sense of community 
while countering the sense of monitoring created by certifications (Bell et al., 2009). 
Certification can increase conflict and increase relationship-damaging behavior (Brown et al., 
2009). Yet, partner communities develop a sense of fairness and commitment (Weber, 2001), 
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operating as a social control buffering against, and neutralizing, a partner's potentially 
negative sentiments and adverse reactions to the certification process. Furthermore, 
certifications signal that the partners belonging to the network have similar baseline 
capabilities. The signal that the partners ‘belong to the same club’ increases their credibility 
thus supporting the relationship-building in partner communities (Grabner-Krauter, 2009; 
Markus and Agres, 2000). Together, they help suppliers to improve the relational 
embeddedness of the partner network structure. These results may partially be driven by 
characteristics of the IT sector: certification is most common in this sector and unlike those, 
such as ISO 9000, used in other sectors, it is applied to all partners. In addition, partner 
communities are very prevalent in IT industries. The long history of these communities in 
this sector and the repeated experiences of the partners with them, is possibly helping 
partners recognize their informational and relational benefits.  
We find that certification and partner communities do not have an interactive effect 
on the performance implications of relational embeddedness. Evidenced by the non-
significant results for hypothesis 2b. It may be that certification diminishes the positive 
effects, such as perceptions of transparency and fairness, generated by partner communities 
(Yu et al. 2006). The monitoring and oversight elements of certification could be viewed as a 
violation of the social norms, trust and integrity embodied in relational embeddedness. An 
alternative explanation may be that relationships which are considered to be closely bound do 
not benefit as expected from certification, and the socialization embodied in partner 
communities, is not enough to offset the negative perceptions of this auditory, evaluative 
process.  
Greater insight into the role of certification and partner communities may be gained 
by drilling down to the 2-way interactions. The results show that certification and partner 
communities work in opposite directions when it comes to the relational aspects of partner 
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networks. We find support for the dark side of certifications, whereby, if used in isolation, 
they may represent a coercive tool that weakens the fabric of interorganizational relationships 
(Gilliland et al., 2010). The results show that certification negatively moderates both the 
relationship between structural embeddedness and relational embeddedness and that of the 
latter with relationship performance (see Model 2, Table 2). This result can be compared to 
previous studies that report that the more a relationship is formally monitored, the more 
opportunistically the monitored party is likely to act (Brown et al., 2016). Similarly, 
formalized governance structures (such as certification) have been linked to the withholding 
or distortion of information (Koza and Dant, 2007). This helps to explain why certification, if 
used in isolation, undermines the effort that has went into planning a network of partners and 
degrades the relational ties that bind them. 
Extant research has shown that through ongoing community engagement, the 
normative influences of the community become ingrained leading to commitment to the 
community (Mathwick et al., 2008). We find support for this view and show that a partner 
community positively moderates the relationship between structural embeddedness and 
relational embeddedness; and between relational embeddedness and relationship performance 
(see Model 2, Table 2). Such communities create the environment for sharing tacit 
information by establishing a common language and rules of behavior (Jones et al., 1997).  
In this study, we make a number of contributions to theory. First, our results support 
earlier research that suggested that the link between structural embeddedness and relationship 
performance is (partially) mediated by relational embeddedness (Carey et al. 2011; Kim, 
2014). This is still a relevant finding to report given the nuances of this context and our unit 
of analysis. Embeddedness takes a unique form in our IT context, given the key role of the 
supplier in managing the positioning of partners within the structural network so that they 
complement, rather than cannibalize each other (Morris et al., 2006; Provan and Kenis, 
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2008). What we can infer from our results is that the support and structure offered through a 
well-planned partner network positively influences partner performance. This relationship 
works in part, through the history of interactions, shared sense of obligation, respect and 
commitment between partners. In other words, relational embeddedness acts a glue binding 
the actors in these complex networks, comprised of many partners. We also recognize that the 
link between the different types of embeddedness and performance needs to be considered in 
relation to significant contingencies, one of which are the governance mechanisms 
organizations employ to manage their relationships (Rowley et al., 2000).  
Our second contribution relates to the governance of large-scale networks, prevalent 
in the IT sector, rather than individual dyads, as per much of the literature to date. Managing 
these networks needs more than a straightforward extrapolation of practices used to manage 
dyadic relationships. Our choice of network governance mechanisms also reflects the sectoral 
uniqueness of the IT context. This addresses the need for a more granular understanding of 
the relative contribution, and limitations, of different network governance mechanisms. 
Although certifications are heavily used as a way of influencing the partners in complex IT 
networks, prior research on their use as a governance mechanism is limited. Similarly, whilst 
increasing attention is being placed on the impact of online communities as value adding 
social mechanisms in supplier-customer exchanges (Bone et al., 2015), the role of partner 
communities as a network governance mechanism has not been explored to date. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our results contribute to the plural form debate 
in governance research. The plural form perspective primarily rests on the supposition that 
formal and informal governance mechanisms work in different ways and have different 
benefits, procedural or relational, respectively. Thus they can be used in tandem. We extend 
previous studies on the plural form view by considering both the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ of 
governance mechanisms, specifically certification, and investigating how the use of formal 
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and informal mechanisms as complements play out when considering both the negative and 
the positive. What we find is that they should be used in tandem: certification and partner 
communities, elevate each other’s strengths thus allowing suppliers leverage their partner 
networks to add value.  
The results show that managers need to reflect carefully on their approach to 
governing partner relationships as some mechanisms, such as certification, can have 
unfavourable consequences. In addition, managers should consider how they might integrate 
online forums and message boards to support their partners. These communities are not only 
an effective medium for the sharing of tacit information which is traditionally difficult to 
codify and control, but they also serve as a supporting mechanism for the more formal 
components of these relationships, such as certifications, which can often be met with 
hesitancy and suspicion.  
Limitations and further research 
This study generates important insights into the governance of a large network of 
partners. We elaborate on the use of certifications in networks as a formal governance 
mechanism and introduce partner communities as an informal mechanism. Our data was 
derived from a cross-sectional survey. Yet, partner networks are social collectives that are 
dynamic and develop over time. Longitudinal research designs should be used in future 
research to track how different partner segments (e.g., newcomers vs. experienced partners) 
develop over time so we can better understand the impact of different governance 
mechanisms in the light of different relationship trajectories (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).   
Our study was conducted in the IT sector, which is a channel environment in which 
the service orientation and the importance of interpersonal relationships lead to the 
development of informal social structures, such as partner communities (Vandaele et al., 
2007). This sector encompasses suppliers of both hardware and software products. Whilst we 
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controlled for this difference, further research could explore the relative importance of 
certification and partner communities based on the type of IT supplier. Furthermore, certain 
idiosyncrasies pertaining to the setting of our research may limit the generalizability of our 
findings. The type of certification we examined, which was focused on training and 
competencies, rather than process development (prevalent in the certification of suppliers). 
Additional research may consider adopting a broader view of certification type, and also 
acknowledge that certification can be managed by third party organizations independent of 
the parties involved in the relationship.  
Our data was collected from network partners which we believe to be entirely 
appropriate, given the research context (where large IT suppliers employ certification and 
partner communities to manage a large number of dispersed small to medium sized partners). 
In this context, partners are required to abide by the supplier’s rules and it is therefore 
important for suppliers to understand the relationship implications of their decisions. Yet, 
given that the supplier has a significant role in setting the network structure, enforcing 
certification and establishing communities, understanding their perspective is important for 
the advancement of network governance research.  
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Appendix. Items, Loadings, Scales, Reliability and Validity 
 
Relationship Performance (CR = 0.94, α = 0.90, AVE = 0.83, HSV= 0.41) 1 
Our business relationship with this supplier is very profitable. 2 
Due to our business relationship with this supplier, our company 
has gained a significant share of the market 
Due to our business relationship with this supplier, our company 
has been able to attract significant numbers of new customers 
0.86 
0.94 
 
0.93 
0.51 
0.59 
 
0.58 
 
0.49 
0.49 
 
0.50 
 
0.24 
0.36 
 
0.37 
 
0.31 
0.42 
 
0.46 
 
Relationship Embeddedness(CR = 0.96, α = 0.94, AVE = 0.90, HSV= 0.41)  
We have a close personal relationship with our supplier 
We have complete trust in our supplier 
There is a great deal of mutual empathy and respect between our 
supplier and ourselves 
We expect a long-lasting relationship with our supplier 3 
0.52 
0.59 
0.59 
 
0.94 
0.94 
0.96 
0.37 
0.49 
0.47 
 
0.29 
0.25 
0.25 
 
0.34 
0.33 
0.37 
 
Partner Network Structure (CR = 0.90, α = 0.85, AVE = 0.69, HSV= 0.29)  
The way in which this supplier manages its network of partners 
is very effective 
The supplier has a very well planned network of partners 
In our business relationship with this supplier, we have a well 
designated market or sales territory 
Our supplier manages its network of partners to avoid them 
directly competing with each other 
0.42 
 
0.44 
0.43 
 
0.39 
 
0.38 
 
0.42 
0.44 
 
0.30 
 
0.86 
 
0.87 
0.83 
 
0.77 
0.22 
 
0.25 
0.36 
 
0.20 
 
0.44 
 
0.45 
0.47 
 
0.43 
 
Certification Governance (CR = 0.89, α = 0.84, AVE = 0.67, HSV= 0.12)  
Our supplier requires us to have substantial resources (i.e 
capital, number of employees) in place before being granted 
certified status 
Our supplier requires our employees to demonstrate a high level 
of knowledge (e.g via examinations, test, qualifications etc) 
before being certified 
In order to be certified, our supplier requires our employees to 
undertake specified training 
Our supplier regularly reviews our certification status 
0.26 
 
 
0.30 
 
 
0.25 
 
0.34 
0.19 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
0.18 
 
0.28 
0.18 
 
 
0.25 
 
 
0.23 
 
0.34 
0.76 
 
 
0.89 
 
 
0.83 
 
0.80 
0.13 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
0.21 
 
0.43 
Partner Community (CR = 0.89, α = 0.83, AVE = 0.66, HSV= 0.29) 
Our supplier encourages us to interact and share information 
with other partners of our supplier 
Our supplier provides useful forums (e.g message boards, chat 
rooms, webinar etc) for discussions between the partners of the 
supplier and between the partners and the supplier 
Discussions with other partners are valuable in helping us solve 
technical problems 
Our relationship with other partners of our suppliers is one of 
co-operation rather than competition. 
0.37 
 
0.31 
 
 
0.39 
 
0.36 
 
0.36 
 
0.26 
 
 
0.26 
 
0.29 
 
0.48 
 
0.46 
 
 
0.40 
 
0.42 
 
0.35 
 
0.36 
 
 
0.26 
 
0.15 
 
0.87 
 
0.79 
 
 
0.78 
 
0.83 
1α = Scale reliability coefficient; CR – Composite reliability; AVE – Average variance extracted; HSV 
– Highest shared variance. 
2All items measured on Likert scale – (1) strongly disagree, (7) strongly agree. 
3Item removed during analysis. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model  
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embeddedness: 
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Relationship 
Performance 
A B C D E F G H 
 A. Relationship 
Embeddedness 
0.63* -      
 
 
 B. Partner Network Structure 0.54* 0.46* -       
 C. Certification Governance 0.36* 0.28* 0.32* -      
 D. Partner Community Gov. 0.44* 0.37* 0.54* 0.34* -     
 E. Relationship Length 0.17+ 0.13 -0.08 0.16+ 0.03 -    
 F. Tier Level -0.35* -0.40* -0.09 -0.24* -0.13 -0.46* -   
 G. Firm Size 0.22* 0.21* 0.08 0.26* 0.01 0.32* -0.41* -  
 H. Supplier dependency 0.32* 0.27* 0.08 0.27* 0.20* 0.28* 0.27* -0.04 - 
 I. Product (hardware) -0.11 -0.15+ -0.10 0.24* 0.09 0.12 -0.09 -0.04 0.22* 
Mean (s.d.)  
4.11 
(1.37) 
4.54 
(1.74) 
4.01 
(1.27) 
5.04 
(1.28) 
3.70 
(1.27) 
- 
  
- 
+significant at 5% level, *significant at 1% level (2-tailed). 
Table 1. Latent Variable Correlations 
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Table 2. PLS Results 
Path Model 11 Model 2 Model 3 
Direct effects model    
Partner Network Structure → Relationship Performance 0.27 (3.62)* 0.23 (3.16)* 0.24 (3.19)* 
Partner Network Structure → Relationship Embeddedness 0.36 (3.60)* 0.34 (3.93)* 0.34 (3.77)* 
Relationship Embeddedness → Relationship Performance 0.34 (3.78)* 0.33 (4.18)* 0.33 (3.98)* 
Relationship Length → Relationship Performance 0.05 (1.14) 0.04 (1.06) 0.04 (0.91) 
Tier Level → Relationship Performance -0.09 (1.44) -0.10 (1.58) -0.11 (1.78) 
Firm Size → Relationship Performance 0.04 (0.75) 0.02 (0.44) 0.02 (0.48) 
Supplier dependency → Relationship Performance 0.13 (1.86) 0.08 (1.56) 0.06 (1.11) 
Product (Hardware) → Relationship Performance -0.10 (1.71) -0.10 (1.80) -0.09 (1.80) 
Certification Governance → Relationship Embeddedness 0.12 (1.54) 0.15 (2.10)* 0.13 (2.18)* 
Partner Community → Relationship Embeddedness 0.13 (1.45) 0.11 (1.40) 0.11 (1.40) 
Certification Governance → Relationship Performance 0.09 (1.42) 0.10 (1.85) 0.10 (1.79) 
Partner Community → Relationship Performance 0.11 (1.48) 0.14 (1.80) 0.14 (1.74) 
2-way interactions    
Network Structure x Certification Governance   → Relationship Embeddedness 
       → Relationship Performance 
 -0.29 (2.64)* 
-0.06 (0.83) 
-0.29 (2.71)* 
-0.06 (1.01) 
Relationship Embeddedness x Certification Governance→ Relationship Performance  -0.16 (1.99)* -0.12 (1.54) 
Network Structure x Partner Community  → Relationship Embeddedness 
       → Relationship Performance 
 0.27 (2.74)* 
-0.08 (1.34) 
0.27 (2.40)* 
-0.07 (1.13) 
Relationship Embeddedness x Partner Community → Relationship Performance  0.13 (1.96)* 0.09 (1.38) 
Certification Governance x Partner Community  → Relationship Embeddedness 
       → Relationship Performance 
 0.15 (1.85) 
0.08 (1.24) 
0.15 (2.02)* 
0.09 (1.64) 
3-way interactions    
Network Structure x Certification x Partner Community → Relationship Embeddedness 
       → Relationship Performance 
  0.14 (1.89) *a 
0.17 (1.99) *a 
Relationship Embeddedness    → Relationship Performance 
   x Certification x Partner Community  
  
-0.10 (1.16) 
Variance explained:  Relationship Embeddedness  R2 
        F change 
   Relationship Performance  R2 
        F change 
0.25 
 
0.54 
 
0.36 
8.25 (0.00) 
0.59 
3.41 (0.01) 
0.38 
4.61 (.03) 
0.62 
 5.45 (0.01) 
 
1. Path Coef. (t-value); * Path significant at p < 0.05 (2-tailed); *a Path significant at p < 0.05 (1-tailed) 
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            (-1 s.d.) (standardized) (+1 s.d.) 
 
 
            (-1 s.d.) (standardized) (+1 s.d.) 
 
Figure 2. 3-Way Interaction on Relationship Performance 
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             (-1 s.d.)   (standardized)     (+1 s.d.) 
 
 
            (-1 s.d.)   (standardized)  (+1 s.d.) 
 
Figure 3. 3-Way Interaction on Relationship Embeddedness 
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